The United Nations and the Rationale for Collective Intelligence
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The United Nations and the Rationale for Collective Intelligence ...

Chapter 1:  Conceptual Framework for Collective Action
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same tools, and this prospect is likely to produce an imprecise outcome. A precise definition of each of these concepts would therefore have to take account of not only situation but also the usefulness of the terms and their expected outcome.2

If, for instance, we compare definitions of collective action, for example, a process of maximising individual as well as social utility through a system of collective efforts, with definitions of cooperation, which state that ‘the actions of separate individuals or organisations—which are not in preexistent harmony—be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation’ or ‘when actors adjust behaviour to actual or anticipated preferences to others, through a process of policy coordination’, and ‘cooperation, as compared to harmony, requires active attempt to adjust policies to meet the demand of others’, it is clear that there are different concepts involved.3 The various definitions of cooperation offered in some studies, especially in IR, take for granted that social interactions are defined by conflict of power relationships. In contrast, the nature of conflict in collective action is defined not in terms of enmity, history, or power relationships but in terms of the production and distributive efficiency of a common good. Within this concept, the term cooperation should be understood from the point of view of its generic meaning, as a behavioural shift. The reasons for readjustment and behavioural change on the part of the participants is not an immediate consideration here but could be relevant to specific research questions attempting to explore such phenomenon, in which case the very meaning of cooperation would need to be qualified.

The term ‘cooperation’ could, in fact, be defined as implying a function of collective action and not as a system of collective action. When the term is used as a concept to encompass all such adjustments or to define every aspect of interactions, it becomes meaningless.4 For example, individuals may conform to or exhibit a certain pattern of behaviour with or without a predefined rule directing their behaviour. They may also conform, behave, or interact in an observable pattern without explicitly manifesting a goal-seeking behaviour or even having any goal attributed