Table and Figures List

xiii

Preface

xv

Acknowledgments

xxi

List of Abbreviations

xxiii

Introduction

1

Desirability and Feasibility

3

The Idea of UN Intelligence

5

Preliminary Assumptions About Collective Intelligence

6

Methodological Approach

7

Developing and Applying Models and Variables

9

Models and Nested Models

11

Overview and Structure of the Book

12

Part I: Theories of Collective Action and Decision Making

17

Chapter 1: Conceptual Framework for Collective Action

19

On the Distinction Between Cooperation and Collective Action

21

Criteria for the Analysis of Collective Action

26

Anarchy, Order, and the Logic of a Centralised Solution for Collective Intelligence

27

Relevance of Authority in the Anarchy Paradigm

30

Many Meanings of Anarchy

32

Chapter 2: Centralised and Decentralised Systems

35

Relevance of Order in Domestic Political Systems

37

Implications of Order and Authority for Decentralised Systems

40

Government as Political Authority

42

Definition of the State as a Further Source of Political Authority

43

Acceptance of Authority and Leadership in Decentralised Systems

45

Chapter 3: The Rationale for Collective Action

51

Incentives and the Feasibility of Collective Action: The Relative and Absolute Gains Debate

53

Micromotives and Macrobehaviour in the Theory of Collective Action

59

Incentives and the Logic of Collective Action

62

Assumptions About Incentive Problems

63

Incentive Compatibility and the Feasibility of Collective Action

66

Consideration of Efficient Output as a Function of Incentives

74

Part II: Interfacing Intelligence With the UN System: Contradictions and Complementarities

79

Chapter 4: Collective Action and the UN: System, Process, and Change

81

The UN: An Overview

82

The Charter

85

The Domestic Jurisdiction Rule

88

The UN and Collective Security: Concepts, Opportunities, and Difficulties

90

Evolution, Change, and the UN Experience

93

Obstacles, Innovations, and Impact on Intelligence Capability

97

Chapter 5: Strategic Intelligence: Concepts, Evolution, and Change

101

Secrecy as a Function

103

Sociology of Secrecy

106

What Is Intelligence?

110

Intelligence or Knowledge

112

The Tasks of Intelligence in Policy and Planning

114

Concepts and Doctrine

121

A Brief History of Change and Functional Crisis

124

From Counterintelligence to Countersubversion

127

Chapter 6: Intelligence Process and Cycle

131

Information Analysis, Decision Making, and the Theory of Intelligence Functions

137

Analysis and the Logic of Intelligence Failure

142

Towards a Viable UN Intelligence Capability

146

Characteristics and the Meaning of UN Intelligence

148

Part III: Towards a Theory of Collective Intelligence: Concepts and Evidence

157

Chapter 7: The Rationale for Collective Intelligence

159

The Idea of Pooled Knowledge

160

Collective Intelligence as a Social Good

163

Strategic and Tactical Intelligence Cooperation

163

History and Development of UN Intelligence

167

The Beginning of the End of EISAS

173

Genesis of ORCI

175

Politics of Reform and the Demise of ORCI

177

UNTAC's Information/Education Process in Cambodia

182

Chapter 8: UN Intelligence Assets: Sources, Methods, and Implications

187

Sources and Methods

188

Information Functions of Special Programmes

194

Research and Analysis in the Secretariat

196

Planning Peacekeeping Operations in the DPKO

202

Development of the Military Intelligence Branch

206

Problems in Coordinating Multinational Intelligence

209

Analysis of Underlying Problems in Coordinating Field Intelligence

211

Part IV: Balance and Consensus as Primary Variables in Multiagency Decision Making: Case Studies on the Feasibility of UN Intelligence Capability

215

Chapter 9: Multiagency Decision Making and the Rationale for Collective Intelligence: Lessons From UNSCOM

217

Assumptions of Coordination in Decentralised Decision-Making Processes

218

UN Special Commission and Intelligence Process in Iraq

219

UNSCOM's Intelligence Structure and Assets

221

Voluntary Disclosure

221

The Legacy of UNSCOM and Implications for the Inspection and Verification Process

224

UNSCOM's Legal Authority Versus Iraq's Sovereignty

226

The Beginning of the End of UNSCOM

231

Assessing the Functions of Third-Party Intervention

234

Chapter 10: Framework for Collective Intelligence: Lessons From UNMOVIC

237

Negotiating Balance and Consensus

241

UNMOVIC's Structure and Processes

243

Intelligence Infrastructure and Assets

246

Operational Guidelines

249

Intelligence in the Balkans: A Study in Balance, Consensus, and Clarity of Objectives

251

UNTAES Mandates

253

Intelligence Success

254

Criteria for a Viable Intelligence Capability in a Collective Security System

257

Chapter 11: Feasibility of Collective Intelligence in a Decentralised Actor Environment

261

Paretian Optimum and the Solution Problem in Decentralised Systems

262

Towards a Stable Solution

264

Conventions and Rules as Functions of Stability

268

Further Criteria for the Feasibility of Collective Action

271

Sliding Scale and Interest Articulation: Assumptions and Characteristics

273

Towards a Definition of the Feasibility of Collective Action With Regard to Optimal Output

277

Conclusions

279

Notes

281

Selected Bibliography

329

Index

377