|
|
and identifies why aspects of it, such as elements of secrecy as well as criminal and unconventional methods, are both controversial and set it apart from other governmental functions.
Chapter 6 argues that a close reading of the literature on the subject suggests that intelligence processes can be defined so as to embrace a complex interrelationship between intelligence activities and the planning environment in terms that reflect the very nature of the system, culture, institutional structure, and political orientation of states or particular organisations. Furthermore, an examination of many of the conceptual definitions of intelligence also reveals that amidst the plethora of complex and sometimes irreconcilable issues emerge opportunities upon which a viable UN intelligence system could be defined. The analysis of these doctrines directs us to acknowledge the many functions of intelligence and to choose among those that are compatible with and strictly conducive to the UN system. It also argues that in spite of the many conceptual and doctrinal obstacles posed by the negative aspects of intelligence institution, there nevertheless are basic commonalities between all forms of knowledge production in terms of its relevance to decisions and planning, and this provides an opportunity upon which an intelligence process could be defined to fit both the structure and peaceful doctrines of the UN.
The question of whether the UN needs an intelligence capability is tackled in chapter 7. It argues, first, that since intelligence is a function of decision making, such a system would be necessary to support the organisation's peace and security endeavour. From this point of view, this chapter examines the extent to which an intelligence system within the UN is both feasible and capable of delivering what might be expected of it, as well as the form it could be constituted. Chapter 8 extends the concept of collective action and collective security, and by defining intelligence as a good in a sharing context, it examines the problems of incentives and optimisation. Furthermore, a discussion on the historical development of a system of intelligence infrastructure and usage within the UN also leads to the proposition that the UN is equipped with an intelligence capability that exists in a form not previously recognised.