Belief-based Energy Technology Development in the United States: A Comparative Study of Nuclear Power and Synthetic Fuel Policies
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States continued to emphasize nuclear power much more than synfuel. In 1975, when President Gerald Ford delivered his message on “The Energy Crisis and Proposed Solutions” to the House, he envisioned 200 major nuclear power plants in 10 years, but only 20 synthetic fuel plants. Nuclear power was on the top of his list, followed by coalmines, coal-fired power plants, and oil refineries. Synfuel ranked merely as the fifth solution.2 However, as the nuclear power buildup entered into dormancy in the late 1970s, synthetic fuels rose as the new superstar. In the Energy Security Act of 1980, synfuels became the new champion and nuclear power entirely disappeared. The enthusiasm in synthetic fuels peaked with the creation of the $88 billion U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC). Unfortunately, the SFC had a short life. After the energy crisis was over, the enthusiasm quickly evaporated, and the SFC was abolished in 1986.

Overarching Question

The juxtaposition of nuclear power and synthetic fuel illuminates an interesting contrast between a strong and long-lasting political endorsement and the lack of it. In the decades following the Second World War, nuclear electricity generation was a preferred technology despite a lack of technical and economic justification. On the other hand, economic forces largely explained the sporadic political supports and business interests in synthetic fuels. The overarching question in this book is why the U.S. government promoted the nuclear power technology and why the U.S. industry commercialized it in the absence of a compelling economic case.

Although the nature of the two technologies differs in many ways, the following table indicates that they are largely comparable in terms of natural resource endowments, cost, advantages, and disadvantages. The difference in their physical characteristics cannot explain their different status in the national policy agenda.

Daniel Sperling distinguished two competing views on the role of technological fixes in energy policy, the price-determined view and