Landmines in Cambodia: Past, Present, and Future By Wade C. Rober ...

the government in Phnom Penh. Government analysis, however, quickly revealed the inability to continue rationing food stock at current rates given the reality of increasing populations arriving within the capital. Food was hoarded and rationing practices were halted. Inflation ensued and starvation quickly followed. The bombing continued. This led to continued urban migration flows and increased rates of starvation and death.

The government, headed by Lon Nol, was correctly deemed corrupt and inept at meeting the needs of the people. Corruption continued to escalate at the expense of the starving populace. The Lon Nol administration was despised along with the imperialist supporters backing the government. Support for Norodom Sihanouk increased. A change of government was needed as the well-being of Cambodians hung in the balance of political strife. Prime Minister Norodom Sihanouk joined forces with the Khmer Rouge almost immediately after being ousted in a staged coup. For many Cambodians, trust in the Khmer Rouge was immediate because Sihanouk was initially portrayed as the institutional leader of the organization. The replacement of the Royal Government of Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge on April 17, 1975, was therefore applauded and gratefully accepted. It was believed nothing could be as bad as being ignored by one’s own government.

The Royal Government of Cambodia both produced landmines and purchased them from abroad. Cambodia is only known to have produced one variety of landmine, the KN-10. There is no evidence Cambodia has ever exported this landmine,¹⁶ and it can therefore be assumed that all of the KN-10s were used domestically. The 1970s production of KN-10s, a directional fragmentation antipersonnel landmine similar to the Vietnamese MDH-10 and former Soviet Union MON-100, ceased when the Khmer Rouge came to power. No official estimates reflecting the magnitude of KN-10 production exist. The production of KN-10s was, however, likely a small percentage of the armament received internationally.

In addition to the domestic production of the KN-10, the Royal Army of Cambodia received armament from various western powers. The United States admits to the transfer of 622,458 antipersonnel mines to the Royal Government of Cambodia between 1971 and 1975, nearly